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Present signs indicate that university faculty are moving slowly, but inexorably, along the 
road to collective bargaining. Faculty in Quebec appear to be in the vanguard of this move-
ment, but there are signs that faculty in other provinces are following in the same direction. 
To many, this may be an alarming development, giving rise to a number of fears, such as 
union organizers disrupting collegial relationships; a closed shop being imposed upon the 
university community; a highly formalized employment relationship replacing the tradi-
tional university-faculty relationship; union solidarity replacing academic excellence; the 
strike and picket line replacing rational discussion; and government and union interference 
in the administration of the universities. Such developments would indeed be undesirable, 
but I submit that they do not necessarily flow from collective bargaining and the present 
legal structure established to regulate it. 
To support this statement, it is necessary to describe the more significant features of 
the existing legal structure regulating collective bargaining. This structure is characterized 
by 1) positive legal support to encourage employees to organize into collectives with the 
purpose of providing a countervailing force to match the economic power of the employer; 
2) strict limits on the use of economic sanctions by either employees or employers; and 
3) a reluctance to interfere in those situations where employers and employees are able to 
establish a harmonious collective bargaining relationship. Since each of these features 
plays a key role in shaping our collective bargaining system, further explanation is needed. 
A primary purpose of existing collective bargaining legislation is to encourage the or-
ganization of employees into collectives for the purpose of bargaining with employers. 
One method of legal assistance is for labour relations legislation to prohibit certain types 
of employer conduct, including employer statements, that interfere with employee organi-
zations. Perhaps of even greater assistance to trade unions is the status conferred by law 
where the union has organized a majority of employees in a particular constituency, called 
the bargaining unit. This status, acquired through a procedure called certification, gives 
the union exclusive authority to bargain for all employees in the bargaining unit, even 
though some of these employees may not be members of the union. The law supports 
this status by prohibiting the employer from bargaining with any other person or organi-
zation. The result is that the law gives a seat at the bargaining table to a union that becomes 
certified as bargaining agent, whether the employer likes it or not. 
Bargaining status, however, does not carry with it the right to strike at all times. In fact, 
existing legislation strictly curtails the right to resort to economic sanctions. Labour legisla-
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tion relating to the private sector only permits the strike and the lockout where the parties 
have made a full attempt to negotiate a collective agreement and have reached an impasse. 
Strikes for the purpose of obtaining employer recognition for a union or strikes for the 
purpose of resolving differences arising under a collective agreement are strictly prohibited. 
Labour relations legislation governing the public sector usually goes further in restricting 
the right to strike. In some Canadian jurisdictions, the right to strike has been totally 
proscribed, being replaced by the procedure of compulsory arbitration.1 In other jurisdic-
tions, the right to strike is still available, but the alternative of compulsory arbitration is 
also made available.2 Finally, there are some jurisdictions where public servants are given 
the same right to strike as employees in the private sector, although public attitudes against 
public service strikes may in fact curtail the actual exercise of this legal right.3 
Despite the fact that the law does play an active role in assisting employee organization 
and in curtailing resort to economic sanctions, it is still possible for a collective bargaining 
relationship to exist without recourse to the legal structure. For example, if an employer 
voluntarily recognizes a union and bargains with it, there is no need, or requirement, 
for the union to seek to have its role legitimized by the legal system. Furthermore, 
the law does not usually dictate the terms of a collective agreement negotiated by an 
employer and union. The exceptions are that the parties are required to agree not to 
resort to economic sanctions during the currency of the agreement, and the parties must 
provide some procedure for the final settlement of disputes arising under their collective 
agreement. On the other hand, if the parties can solve contractual grievances by negotia-
tion, there is then no need to resort to final settlement procedures, usually grievance 
arbitration. Even if the parties find that they must resort to grievance arbitration, the law 
gives them the opportunity to select the arbitrator by agreement between themselves. 
Thus, the present legal structure provides ample scope for the parties to work out their 
differences without resort to the law. 
In fact, it is even possible for collective bargaining to occur outside of labour relations 
legislation. A good example is the school teachers of Ontario, a group excluded from 
labour relations legislation, but who in fact now bargain collectively with school boards. 
Another group of employees that established a collective bargaining relationship outside 
of existing labour relation legislation was the Ontario Crown employees, although this 
relationship is now regulated by statute. A further example, close to home, is the rudimen-
tary form of collective bargaining now engaged in by faculty at some Canadian universities. 
Since it is possible to bargain collectively without recourse to the existing legal struc-
ture, it is possible to conclude that collective bargaining by university faculty need not be 
'l7or example, the Ontario Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act completely prohibits the 
strike and lock-out, substituting arbitration as the method of dispute resolution. 
2 The federal Public Service Staff Relations Act and the New Brunswick Public Service Labour Re-
lations Act provide an option of compulsory arbitration or strike action. The right to strike is re-
stricted to some extent by a provision in both Acts whereby certain "designated" employees, 
whose services are considered to be necessary "in the interest of the safety and security of the 
public," are prevented from striking. 
3The collective bargaining laws of Quebec, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba make very little distinction 
between the private and public sectors. Recent experiences in Quebec, however, indicate that, as a 
practical matter, it is more difficult to exercise the right to strike in the public sector. 
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shaped in the mould of the existing legal structure. If universities and members of faculty 
could agree on their own procedures for collective bargaining, then certain features of 
collective bargaining, considered to be incompatible with the university community, could 
be avoided. It would be possible, for example, to avoid purging faculty associations of 
colleagues with managerial responsibilities, a necessary exercise if faculty associations were 
to seek legal status. Universities and their faculty could also bargain for a set of rules to 
govern the employment relationship different than those bargained for in the industrial 
sector.4 These are only two examples, but the point is that the present legal structure 
does allow scope for the parties to build their own collective bargaining relationship 
through voluntary co-operation. 
Once a collective bargaining structure is established, however, it may be increasingly 
difficult for faculty and universities to operate in a complete legal vacuum. Two factors 
make it likely that legal rules may be imposed from the outside. First, it is probably being 
overly optimistic to think that all matters in dispute between universities and faculty mem-
bers can be resolved through co-operation. In cases of impasse, either side may be tempted 
to resort to the existing legal structure for assistance, or even attempt to obtain new legis-
lation to govern their collective bargaining relationship. Even if the parties can resist the 
temptation to invoke the law for reasons of self-interest, it is quite possible that govern-
ments may decide that they have some interest in the collective bargaining process and 
attempt to regulate it by legislation. The government, after all, is now very much the 
paymaster of faculty, so that the effective exercise of collective power by faculty may 
well arouse their interest. 
In view of the likelihood of some form of legal intervention, it is important to ask 
whether the present legal structure meets all the needs of university collective bargaining. 
At the present time, in Canada, there is a well-established legal regime for private sector 
collective bargaining, and an emerging legal regime for public sector collective bargaining. 
Although both structures possess many common elements, there appear to be two main 
differences between them. First, collective bargaining legislation dealing with the public 
sector usually places greater restriction on the use of economic sanctions. A second dif-
ference is that the constituencies for collective bargaining, the bargaining units, are gener-
ally much larger in the public sector than in the private sector. This difference may well 
be due to the fact that public sector collective bargaining is much more of an exercise in 
political persuasion than is private sector bargaining. 
The next question is which one of these two existing structures is more appropriate 
for university collective bargaining. My own view is that the public sector regime is the 
more suitable of the two, although by no means completely appropriate. Some general 
considerations support this opinion. First, universities now appear to be much more 
closely related to the public domain than to private enterprise. The fact is that govern-
ments are now the primary source of financing for our universities, making the operation 
4 The question of the compatibility of collective bargaining and a merit system for the determination 
of salaries was touched upon in a recent arbitration award (October 29, 1973) involving the Board 
of Governors of Ryerson Poly-technical Institute and the Ryerson Faculty Association. The arbitra-
tor, Mr. H. D. Brown, although refusing to award the merit system requested by the employer and 
opposed by the faculty association, did indicate that a merit system could fit within a collective 
bargaining framework, if agreed to by both parties. 
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of universities a matter of public concern. A further consideration is that the value of the 
type of service provided by the university, like many of the services provided by depart-
ments of government, cannot be readily determined by market-place considerations. The 
question of how much these services are worth is more a political decision to be made by 
government than one to be dictated by the market place, since the government effectively 
controls the market for such services. Moreover, it is difficult to apply market concepts 
such as productivity when dealing with the type of services provided by universities and 
governments. A third consideration is that there is a public expectation that university 
services, like other public services, should not be withheld. Certainly, if the services pro-
vided by the university were interrupted, it would be difficult to make up the loss. The 
resulting disruption to the teacher-student relationship would be difficult to repair, no 
matter how much extra effort was made after the strike. Although some of our students 
may disagree with this opinion, I believe that the services provided by the university are 
of an essential nature, which means that any interruption of them would likely be regarded 
with disfavour by the public. These general considerations have, therefore, led me to con-
clude that university collective bargaining is likely to be more akin to public sector collec-
tive bargaining. 
This conclusion can be tested by applying the unique features of the public sector 
collective bargaining structure to university collective bargaining. As I have mentioned, 
the constituency for collective bargaining, the bargaining unit, takes a different shape 
than its private sector counterpart. The public sector bargaining unit is generally as wide, 
in geographic terms, as the unit of government with which the bargaining unit is dealing, 
and may or may not be defined along occupational lines.5 The result is that, in the public 
sector, bargaining units generally tend to be much larger and fewer in number. Given the 
greater restraints on the right to strike in the public sector, the larger bargaining unit is 
probably necessary'for employees to be able to exercise influence at the bargaining 
table. Instead of the threat of economic sanctions, the government as employer is faced 
with the threat of disapproval by a significant block of voters, who may also be able to 
enlist the support of the general public in aid of their cause. 
If the public sector model were applied to university collective bargaining, the 
result could be the establishment of large province-wide bargaining units, one for aca-
demic staff and one for non-academic staff, to deal with the government as paymaster. 
Although it might be more desirable for purposes of bargaining power to have just one 
large bargaining unit, I doubt whether this would occur. The fact is that there is probably 
not a sufficient community of interest among academic and non-academic staff to make 
such a large bargaining unit sufficiently cohesive. Moreover, a number of unions now 
have established claims to represent the non-academic staff and it is doubtful, in view 
of the uncertainty of organizing academic staff, whether these unions will give up their 
claims for a chance to organize one large bargaining unit. 
On the other hand, if the private sector model were applied, the result might well be 
5 In Ontario bargaining units, as a general rule, have not been defined along occupational lines with 
the result that there are only four bargaining units (with one unit much larger than the other three) 
covering most employees of the province. In the federal public service, on the other hand, bargain-
ing units have been defined along occupational lines and the result has been substantially more 
bargaining units than in Ontario. 
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a number of local bargaining units at each university. Non-academic staff might form a 
number of units at each university, and it is possible that academic staff, too, might 
form a number of units at each university. Once organized, these units would then 
bargain with their respective universities. The result is likely to be unsatisfactory. The 
fact is that the university is not the real paymaster, so that collective bargaining efforts 
would probably be misdirected. Even if the bargaining units were to attempt to apply 
some pressure on government, it is doubtful whether their efforts would have any signi-
ficant impact. Thus, the public sector approach of large bargaining units dealing with 
government appears to be more appropriate than the fragmented approach of the private 
sector model. 
The method of dispute resolution provided by the public sector model, compulsory 
arbitration, also appears more suitable to faculty collective bargaining. The strike does 
not appear to be an effective method of resolving disputes arising out of faculty collec-
tive bargaining. First, because of the superior economic position of the paymaster 
(government), the most that strike action would hope to achieve is that public attention 
be brought to bear on the dispute. It is doubtful, however, whether public reaction 
would be favourable to a faculty strike, especially if university services are regarded as 
being essential. Second, and perhaps more important, is the fact that most faculty would 
likely be very loath to withdraw their services. Not only would such a withdrawal of 
services disrupt the student-teacher relationship but, to many, it would also represent 
a retreat from reason. Finally, faculty may well do better under arbitration, since the 
professional arbitrator may well be sympathetic to the plight of fellow professionals.6 
Thus, I would suggest that, if an impasse developed, most faculty would prefer to have 
the choice of compulsory arbitration to resolve the impasse. 
The public sector collective bargaining model does appear to be more suitable for 
university collective bargaining, but I would not wish to see that structure applied to 
the universities without modification. If universities are to retain any of their traditional 
autonomy from government, it is necessary that the government not be allowed to 
assume the full role of employer at the bargaining table. The problem, as I see it, is that 
the government in its role as paymaster must be present at negotiations, since collective 
bargaining would probably be meaningless without its presence. On the other hand, if 
the government is present at the bargaining table, it may insist on playing the role of 
employer as well as the role of paymaster. The result could be a serious erosion of uni-
versity autonomy. 
There are two methods that might be used to overcome this problem. First, some 
attempt could be made to restrict the issues on the bargaining table. Perhaps a distinction 
might be made between issues relating to the terms of employment of faculty and issues 
relating to the management of the universities. I would suggest, however, that such a 
distinction would be difficult to maintain, since issues have a tendency to overlap. It 
would be difficult, for example, to bargain for wages without talking of class size. To 
6 In the recent Ryerson award, see footnote 4, the arbitrator awarded a general increase of T/i% in 
addition to any annual increment to which faculty would be entitled under the incremental system. 
In making this award, the arbitrator recognized the effect of both inflation and the growth of the 
gross national product, expressly stating that persons in educational professions were entitled to a 
share in any growth of the economy. 
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give another example, the question of tenure relates both to terms of employment and 
to the management of the university. Moreover, faculty demand for greater participation 
in the running of the university may well be one of the reasons for its adoption of col-
lective bargaining. If this is the case, then faculty may be reluctant to see issues relating 
to the management of the university considered as non-bargainable.7 Governments, as 
well, may not wish to see issues restricted in this way, when they are going to be paying 
most of the cost of the wage increases resulting from collective bargaining. Thus, I would 
suggest that any attempt to limit the range of bargainable issues in advance of bargaining 
is likely to create problems at the bargaining table. 
The second method of protecting university autonomy during the collective bargain-
ing process would be to provide for a strong university presence at the bargaining table. 
By this I mean that those that manage the university, as well as the bargaining agent and 
the government, should be present at the bargaining table. Even more desirable would be 
a system that provided for the universities and faculties working out their differences 
before the bargaining session with government. This might be accomplished by a two-tier 
system of collective bargaining, consisting of a lower tier at which university and faculty 
worked out their differences between themselves, and an upper tier where a common 
front of university and faculty bargain with government. This type of system, which 
now appears to be established in Britain, might be workable in Canada.8 The university 
and its faculty probably do have many interests in common, so that agreement at the 
lower tier may not be that difficult to achieve. Moreover, the need for a strong common 
front with which to meet government will provide an important incentive for agreement at 
the lower level. At the higher level, the common front of university and faculty bargaining 
agent may well provide a sufficiently strong voice to protect university autonomy from 
government encroachment and at the same time, bargain for a salary scale and a salary 
budget. The success of this bargaining procedure would, of course, very much depend 
on how persuasive the university common front is in making its argument to the govern-
ment and the general public. 
At first glance this form of collective bargaining may not appear to be much different 
from the present appeals by universities for government funds. There are, however, two 
important differences. First, there would be greater participation by faculty in the pro-
cess of dealing with government. Second, the government would be made directly 
accountable for the salaries of university faculty. This is in contrast with the present 
system where governments, by simply setting general guidelines for financing, obscure 
their role as paymaster of faculty salaries. 
In conclusion, I would suggest that all members of the university community should 
be giving serious thought to the possibilities of collective bargaining. Although faculty 
collective bargaining may never be a reality for universities, the university community 
7This type of distinction has been a contentious issue with school teachers in Ontario. The recom-
mendation of the Reville Report (The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Negotiation Pro-
cedures Concerning Elementary and Secondary Schools of Ontario 1972) that such a distinction 
be established has met with sharp criticism from the teachers. 
8This structure is examined in greater detail in B. L. Adell and D. D. Carter, Collective Bargaining 
for University Faculty in Canada (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University 1972). 
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should at least be giving consideration to this possibility. Some thought, moreover, 
should be given to the question of the appropriate structure for faculty collective bar-
gaining. In devising this structure, care should be taken to borrow those features of the 
existing collective bargaining structures that are appropriate to the university. If this 
caution is kept in mind, then it may very well be possible to shape a collective bargain-
ing structure that will be compatible with the traditional values of the university. 
